



Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks

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Summary

Iraq's political system, the result of a U.S.-supported election process, has been increasingly characterized by peaceful competition, as well as by attempts to form cross-sectarian alliances. However, ethnic and factional infighting continue, as evidenced by the successful efforts by Shiite Arab political leaders to disqualify some prominent Sunni Arab candidates in the March 7, 2010, national elections. Election-related violence has occurred, although not at levels of earlier years. Some believe that, in light of the disqualifications, sectarian violence will flare anew, after the elections, and may increase further as the U.S. military presence recedes in 2010 and 2011.

Adding to the tensions is the perception among many Iraqi politicians that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, strengthened politically by the January 31, 2009, provincial elections, is increasingly authoritarian. This is in part to demonstrate that he is committed to law and order, but perhaps also to win Shiite Muslim votes by portraying himself as intent on preventing any possible return of the Baath Party to power in Iraq. He has tried, with only mixed enthusiasm and success, to form cross-sectarian alliances with a range of Sunni and Kurdish factions. However, the slates that oppose him in the election are somewhat more broad ethnically and politically than is his, and Maliki is not assured of remaining Prime Minister when a new government is formed.

The infighting among the major communities delayed the National Assembly's passage of the election law needed to hold the elections. An initial version of the election law was passed by the Council of Representatives (COR, parliament) on November 8, 2009, but was vetoed by one of Iraq's deputy presidents, Tariq al Hashimi, because of what he considered inadequate guarantees of representation for Sunni Iraqis. After continued disputes, threatened election boycotts, and adoption of another draft law that attracted another veto threat, all major factions adopted a draft—similar to the first version—on December 6, 2009. The next Assembly will have 325 seats, compared to 275 seats in the current Assembly. The election date of March 7, 2010, is well beyond the January 31, 2010, date that was originally targeted. This same difficulty of achieving consensus has delayed key outstanding legislation considered crucial to political comity going forward, such as national hydrocarbon laws, and may account for an apparent increase in violence in Iraq as campaigning begins (February 12).

To date, the election infighting and violence—evidenced most notably by major bombings in Baghdad—have not jeopardized the Obama Administration's announced reduction of the U.S. troop presence to about 50,000 U.S. forces by August 2010. Under the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement that took effect January 1, 2009, and which President Obama has said would be followed, all U.S. forces are to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. Senior U.S. military leaders continue to say that the U.S. draw-down plans are "on track." However, U.S. plans could be upset if the political infighting causes a major increase in violence or if the post-election political process of choosing the executive branch is held up for several months. See CRS Report RL31339, *Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security*, by Kenneth Katzman.

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Overview of the Political Transition

Iraq has largely completed a formal political transition from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein to a plural polity that encompasses varying sects and ideological and political factions. However, grievances and disputes among these groups remain over the relative claim of each on power and economic resources. These disputes permeate and complicate almost every issue in Iraq, including security, the terms and framework for elections, economic decision making, and foreign policy.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in April 2003, the United States set up an occupation structure, reportedly based on concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major factions and not produce democracy. In May 2003, President Bush, reportedly seeking strong leadership in Iraq, named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to head a "Coalition Provisional Authority" (CPA), which was recognized by the United Nations as an occupation authority. Bremer discontinued a tentative political transition process and instead appointed (July 13, 2003) a non-sovereign Iraqi advisory body, the 25-member "Iraq Governing Council" (IGC). After about one year of occupation, the United States handed sovereignty to an appointed Iraqi interim government on June 28, 2004. It was headed by a Prime Minister, Iyad al-Allawi, leader of the Iraq National Accord, a secular, non-sectarian faction. Allawi is a Shiite but many INA leaders were Sunnis, and some of them were formerly members of the Baath Party. The president of this interim government was Ghazi al-Yawar, a Sunni tribal figure who spent many years in Saudi Arabia.

January 2005 National Assembly and Provincial Elections

A series of elections in 2005 produced the full-term government that is in power today. In line with a March 8, 2004, "Transitional Administrative Law" (TAL, interim constitution), the first post-Saddam election was held on January 30, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly (which formed an executive), four-year term provincial councils in all 18 provinces and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats). According to the "proportional representation/closed list" election system, voters chose among "political entities" (a party, a coalition of parties, or persons); 111 entities were on the national ballot, of which nine were multi-party coalitions. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population) boycotted, winning only 17 Assembly seats, and only one seat on the 51-seat Baghdad provincial council. That council was dominated (28 seats) by representatives of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), led by Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim. Radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, then at odds with U.S. forces, also boycotted, leaving his faction poorly represented on provincial councils in the Shiite south and in Baghdad. The resulting transitional government placed Shiites and Kurds in the highest positions—Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani was President and Da'wa (Shiite party) leader Ibrahim al-Jafari was Prime Minister. Sunnis were Assembly speaker, deputy president, a deputy prime minister, and six ministers, including defense.

Permanent Constitution

The elected Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. On May 10, 2005, a 55-member drafting committee was appointed, but with only two Sunni Arabs (15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 as advisors). In August 2005, the talks produced a draft, providing for a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether

Kirkuk (Tamim province) would join the Kurdish region (Article 140); designation of Islam as “a main source” of legislation;¹ a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47); families choosing which courts to use for family issues (Article 41); making only primary education mandatory (Article 34); and having Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the federal supreme court (Article 89). Many women opposed the two latter provisions as giving too much discretion to male family members. It made all orders of the U.S.-led occupation authority (Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA) applicable until amended (Article 126), and established a “Federation Council” (Article 62), a second chamber with size and powers to be determined in future law (not adopted to date).

The major disputes—still to some extent unresolved—centered on regional versus centralized power. The draft permitted two or more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions”—reaffirmed in passage of an October 2006 law on formation of regions. Article 117 allows “regions” to organize internal security forces, legitimizing the fielding of the Kurds’ *peshmerga* militia (allowed by the TAL). Article 109 requires the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current fields” in proportion to population, and gave regions a role in allocating revenues from new energy discoveries. Disputes over these concepts continue to hold up passage of national hydrocarbons legislation. Sunnis dominate areas of Iraq that have few proven oil or gas deposits, and favor centralized control of oil revenues, whereas the Kurds want to maintain maximum control of their own burgeoning energy sector.

With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85%) to try to defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11, 2005) providing for a panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December 15 election government took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another two months (under the same rules as the October 15 referendum). The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively, but the constitution was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55% “no,” missing the threshold for a “no” vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.

December 15, 2005, Elections

The December 15, 2005, elections were for a full-term (four-year) national government (in line with the schedule laid out in the TAL). Under the voting mechanism used for that election, each province contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives” (COR)—a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation. Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that would have won additional seats had the constituency been the whole nation. There were 361 political “entities,” including 19 multi-party coalitions, competing in a “closed list” voting system (in which party leaders choose the persons who will actually sit in the Assembly). As shown in **Table 3**, voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, and the Shiites and Kurds again emerged dominant. The COR was inaugurated on March 16, 2006, but political infighting caused the Shiite bloc “United Iraqi Alliance” to replace Jafari with another Da’wa figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime Minister.

On April 22, 2006, the COR approved Talabani to continue as president. His two deputies are Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq al-Hashimi, leader of the broad Sunni-based coalition called the Accord Front (“Tawafuq”—within

¹ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html>.

which Hashimi leads the Iraqi Islamic Party). Another Accord figure, the hardline Mahmoud Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), became COR speaker. Maliki won COR approval of a 37-member cabinet (including two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots (Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not filled permanently until June 2006, due to infighting. Of the 37 posts, there were 19 Shiites; 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; and 1 Christian. Four were women.

Political Reconciliation and Subsequent Elections

The 2005 elections were considered successful by the Bush Administration but did not resolve the Sunni Arab grievances over their diminished positions in the power structure. The Sunni-led insurgency accelerated in the two subsequent years, in turn prompting the empowerment of Shiite militia factions to counter the insurgency. The sectarian violence was so serious that many experts said that the U.S. mission in Iraq was failing.

In August 2006, the Administration and Iraq agreed on a series of “benchmarks” that, if adopted and implemented, might achieve political reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-28), “progress” on 18 political and security benchmarks—as assessed in Administration reports due by July 15, 2007, and then September 15, 2007—was required for the United States to provide \$1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq. President Bush used the waiver provision. The law also mandated an assessment by the GAO, by September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks have been met, as well as an outside assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF).

As 2008 progressed, citing the achievement of many of the major legislative benchmarks—and a dramatic drop in sectarian violence that the Administration attributed largely to the U.S. “troop surge”—the Bush Administration asserted that political reconciliation was advancing. However, U.S. officials maintained that the extent and durability of reconciliation would depend on the degree of implementation of adopted laws, on further compromises among ethnic groups, and on continued attenuated levels of violence. For Iraq’s performance on the “benchmarks, see **Table 4**.

The Strengthening of Maliki and the Iraqi Government: 2008-2009

The passage of key legislation in 2008 and the continued calming of the security situation enhanced Maliki’s political position through 2008 and 2009. A March 2008 offensive ordered by Maliki against the Sadr faction and other militants in Basra and environs pacified the city, weakened Sadr politically, and caused many Sunnis and Kurds to see Maliki as even-handed and non-sectarian. This contributed to a decision in July 2008 by the Accord Front to end its one-year boycott of the cabinet. Other cabinet vacancies were filled with independents, essentially putting to rest indicators that major blocs might vote Maliki out of the Prime Ministership. (In 2007, the Accord Front, the Sadr faction, and the bloc of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi pulled out of the cabinet, leaving it with 13 vacant seats, out of 37 cabinet slots, severely weakening Maliki politically.)

Although Maliki’s growing strength increased the Bush and then Obama Administration’s optimism for continued stability, Maliki’s strength caused concern even among Maliki’s erstwhile political allies. They saw him as increasingly building a following in the security forces, and creating new security organs loyal to him and his faction. Through his Office of the Commander-

in-Chief, he directly commands the National Counter-Terrorism Force (over 5,000 and set to rise to 9,000 personnel) as well as the Baghdad Brigade, responsible for security in the capital. In 2008, the Kurds were highly critical of his formation of government-run “tribal support councils” in northern Iraq, which the Kurds see as an effort to prevent them from gaining control of disputed territories that they want to integrate into their Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Other support councils were created in southern Iraq. As another example, in February 2010, Maliki’s government reportedly directed the Iraqi Army’s Fourth Division to cordon a provincial council building in Tikrit to influence the resolution of a dispute over the Salahuddin provincial council’s ousting of the former governor of the province.² A further February 2010 incident involved the government’s order to arrest a major Sunni leader south of Baghdad (Shaykh Turki Talal), an arrest that was later reversed after reported U.S. intervention.³

January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections and Implications

The political fears of some factions about Maliki’s consolidation of power were evident in the context of the January 31, 2009, provincial elections. Under a 2008 law, provincial councils in Iraq choose the governor and provincial governing administrations in each province, making them powerful bodies that provide ample opportunity to distribute patronage and guide provincial politics. ISCI, which had already been distancing itself from its erstwhile ally, Maliki’s Da’wa Party, ran under a separate slate from Maliki’s in the provincial elections. This represented a fracturing of the successful UAI bloc that had dominated the 2005 elections. Ideologically, ISCI favors more power for the provinces and less for the central government; centralization is Maliki’s preferred power structure.

The provincial elections had originally been planned for October 1, 2008, but were delayed when Kurdish restiveness over integrating Kirkuk and other disputed territories into the KRG caused a presidential council veto of the July 22, 2008, election law needed to hold these elections. That draft provided for equal division of power in Kirkuk (among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans) until its status is finally resolved, prompting Kurdish opposition to any weakening of their dominance in Kirkuk. On September 24, 2008, the COR passed a final election law, providing for the elections by January 31, 2009 and putting off provincial elections in Kirkuk and the three KRG provinces.⁴

In the elections, in which there was virtually no violence on election day, about 14,500 candidates vied for the 440 provincial council seats in the 14 Arab-dominated provinces of Iraq. About 4,000 of the candidates were women. The average number of council seats per province was about 30,⁵ down from a set number of 41 seats per province (except Baghdad) in the 2005-2009 councils. The new Baghdad provincial council has 57 seats. This yielded an average of more than 30 candidates per council seat, which some see as enthusiasm for democracy in Iraq. However, the reduction in number of seats also meant that many incumbents would not be reelected.

² Myers, Steven Lee and Anthony Shadid. “Maliki Faulted On Using Army in Iraqi Politics.” *New York Times*, February 11, 2010.

³ Levinson, Charles. “In Iraq, U.S. Forces Hang On To Power.” *Wall Street Journal*, March 1, 2010.

⁴ The election law also stripped out provisions in the vetoed version to allot 13 total reserved seats, spanning six provinces, to minorities. An October 2008 amendment restored six reserved seats for minorities: Christian seats in Baghdad, Nineveh, and Basra; one seat for Yazidis in Nineveh; one seat for Shabaks in Nineveh; and one seat for the Sabeen sect in Baghdad

⁵ Each provincial council has 25 seats plus one seat per each 200,000 residents over 500,000.

The provincial elections were conducted on an “open list” basis—voters were able to vote for a party slate, or for an individual candidate (although they also had to vote for that candidate’s slate as well). This procedure encourages voting for slates, and strengthened the ability of political parties to choose who on their slate will occupy seats allotted for that party. This election system was widely assessed to favor larger, well-organized parties, because smaller parties might not meet the vote threshold to obtain any seats on the council in their province.⁶ This was seen as likely to set back the hopes of some Iraqis that the elections would weaken the Islamist parties, both Sunni and Shiite, that have dominated post-Saddam politics.

About 17 million Iraqis (any Iraqi 18 years of age or older) were eligible for the vote, which was run by the Iraqi Higher Election Commission (IHEC). Pre-election-related violence was minimal, although five candidates and several election/political workers were killed. There were virtually no major violent incidents on election day. Turnout was about 51%, somewhat lower than some expected, and some voters complained of being turned away at polling places because their names were not on file. Other voters had been displaced by sectarian violence in prior years and were unable to vote in their new areas of habitation.

The vote totals were finalized on February 19, 2009, and were certified on March 29, 2009. Within 15 days of that (by April 13, 2009) the provincial councils began to convene under the auspices of the incumbent provincial governor, and to elect a provincial council chairperson and deputy chairperson. Within another 30 days after that (by May 12, 2009) the provincial councils elected (by absolute majority) a provincial governor and deputy governors. The term of the provincial councils is four years from the date of first convention.

Outcomes

The fears of Maliki’s opponents were realized when his list (“State of Law Coalition”) was the clear winner of the provincial elections. His Shiite opponents (his former allies) all ran separate slates and fared generally poorly. With 28 out of the 57 total seats, the Maliki slate gained effective control, by itself, of the Baghdad provincial council (displacing ISCI). Da’wa also emerged very strong in most of the Shiite provinces of the south, including Basra, where it won an outright majority (20 out of 35 seats).

The apparent big loser in the elections was ISCI, which had been favored because it is well organized and well funded. ISCI did not win in Najaf province, which it previously dominated and which, because of Najaf’s revered status in Shiism, is considered a center of political gravity in southern Iraq. It won seven seats there, the same number that was won by the Maliki slate. ISCI won only 3 seats on the Baghdad province council, down from the 28 it held previously, and only five in Basra. Some observers believe that the poor showing for ISCI was a product not only of its call for devolving power out of Baghdad, but also because of its perceived close ties to Iran, which some Iraqis believe is exercising undue influence on Iraqi politics. The Sadrist lists fared little better than did ISCI’s slate, although post-election coalition politics put some Sadrists in senior posts in some provinces.

The unexpected strength of secular parties such as that of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi, corroborated the view that voters favored slates committed to strong central government and “rule of law,” as well as to the concept of Iraqi nationalism. This trend was also reflected in the strong

⁶ The threshold for winning a seat is: the total number of valid votes divided by the number of seats up for election.

showing of a single candidate in Karbala province who was well thought of in the province for even-handedness.

Although Maliki's coalition was the clear winner in the elections, the subsequent efforts to form provincial administrations demonstrated that he still needed to strike bargains with rival factions, including Sadr, ISCI, and even the Sunni list of Saleh al-Mutlaq (National Dialogue Front) that contains many ex-Baathists. The provincial administrations that took shape, mostly in line with set deadlines above, are in **Table 4** below.

Maliki's Position as March 7, 2010, Elections Approach

Because of his slate's showing in the provincial elections, Maliki was deemed throughout 2009 to be well positioned for the March 7, 2010, parliamentary elections, which will choose the next full-term government. He has reached compromise with political competitors in some provinces, including those dominated by Sunni Arabs, and he has included Sunni tribalists and other diverse figures into his State of Law coalition that will compete in the March vote. Maliki also derived strength from the ongoing U.S. implementation of the U.S.-Iraq "Security Agreement" (sometimes referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA). The agreement passed the COR on November 27, 2008, over Sadrism opposition. The pact took effect January 1, 2009, limiting the prerogatives of U.S. troops to operate in Iraq and setting a timetable of December 31, 2011, for a complete U.S. troop withdrawal. President Obama, on February 27, 2009, outlined a U.S. troop drawdown plan that comports with the major provisions of the Agreement.

The first major milestone of the U.S.-Iraq Agreement was the June 30, 2009, withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraq's cities. This was strictly implemented by U.S. forces, to the point where U.S. forces pulled out of locations in the restive Mosul area and from Sadr City, where Gen. Raymond Odierno (top U.S. commander in Iraq) felt U.S. forces should stay. Maliki hailed this interim milestone as a "victory" and declared it a national holiday.

However, as 2010 began, Maliki has been increasingly perceived as vulnerable. Polling data is sporadic, but many observers now expect his slate to win a plurality, but not a majority that would ensure his continuation as Prime Minister. The Iraqi constitution mandates that the slate with the largest share of votes gets the first opportunity to form a government, but a failure to win a majority would throw the governmental formation process open to other Prime Ministerial candidates. Maliki's image as protector of law and order was shaken by the several high-profile attacks since June 2009, including several major multiple bombing attacks in central Baghdad. Additional bombings have taken place in Baghdad, Diyala Province, Anbar Province, and elsewhere as the election has approached. Some believe that insurgents conducted these attacks with the intent of weakening Maliki's image as a strong leader. Others see these incidents as an effort by Al Qaeda in Iraq or other un-reconciled Sunni insurgent groups to reduce Sunni participation in the elections and/or reignite civil war.

Realizing the potential for security lapses to reduce his chances to remain Prime Minister, Maliki ordered several ISF commanders questioned for lapses in connection with the major bombings in Baghdad on August 20, 2009, in which almost 100 Iraqis were killed and the Ministry of Finance and of Foreign Affairs were heavily damaged. The makeshift new Ministry of Finance buildings were attacked again on December 7, 2009. After this bombing, which also resulted in the parliament's insistence that it hear Maliki's explanation of his responses, Maliki replaced the commander of the Baghdad Brigade. He also has attempted to place substantial blame for the

lapses on the Interior Minister, Jawad Bolani, who is running a rival slate in the March 2010 national elections. (See box below on major slates in the election.)

The infighting between Maliki and his critics has also had the effect of stalling movement on remaining crucial legislation, such as that discussed in **Table 4** below. Some note that efforts to rein in official corruption are failing because no comprehensive anti-corruption law has been passed. Also not passed are laws on the environment, those governing other elections, consumer protections, intellectual property rights, building codes, and a new national flag.

The March 7, 2010, Elections: Other Coalitions, Processes, and Political Infighting

Apparently because of its weakness going into the national elections, ISCI reportedly tried to enlist the support of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the senior clerical leader in Iraq, to call for reconstituting the UIA for the March 7 National Assembly elections. That did not succeed, and several major competing coalitions, including Shiite slates, have formed to compete against Maliki's slate. Sistani has remained completely neutral in the election, endorsing no slate, but calling on all Iraqis to participate.

As noted, some of the new coalitions—particularly the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) that groups ISCI and the Sadr faction, along with other Shiite figures—may have substantial support. The INA coalition believes that each of its component factions can draw support from their individual constituencies to produce an election majority or clear plurality. There are about 6,500 total candidates running on all slates registered for the election. All blocs are offering voters gifts and favors at pre-election rallies, and all available press reports indicate that campaigning has been vibrant and vigorous. The slate led by Interior Minister Bolani held a huge public rally in Baghdad, the only slate to make extensive use of such campaign tactics.

The table below outlines what appear to be the strongest coalitions in the elections, and some political figures in those slates that could emerge as national leaders in the next government, if their slates fare well.

Table 1. Major Coalitions Formed for 2010 National Elections

State of Law Coalition	Led by Maliki and his Da'wa Party. Includes Anbar Salvation Front of Shaykh Hatim al-Dulaymi, which is Sunni, and the Independent Arab Movement of Abd al-Mutlaq al-Jabbouri. However, has appealed to Shiite sentiments and sectarianism during the campaign, particular in supporting excluding candidates with links to outlawed Baath Party. Was previously widely favored in the 2010 election because of strong showing in January 2009 provincial elections. Now perceived as likely to win a relatively narrow plurality and not outright majority, clouding Maliki's prospects to continue as Prime Minister.
Iraqi National Alliance	Formed in August 2009, considered the most formidable challenger to Maliki's slate. Consists mainly of his erstwhile Shiite opponents and is perceived as somewhat more Islamist than the other slates. Includes ISCI, the Sadr movement, the Fadilah Party, the Iraqi National Congress of Ahmad Chalabi, and the National Reform Movement of former Prime Minister (Da'wa) Ibrahim al-Jafari. Likely Prime Ministerial nominee if this bloc prevails is current deputy President Adel Abd al-Mahdi, a moderate ISCI leader well respected by U.S. officials. However, some observers say Chalabi – the key architect of the effort to exclude candidates with Baathist ties -- may be scheming to try to become Prime Minister if the bloc later divides over Abd al-Mahdi's elevation. Some ISCI

	members of this slate are candidates in Kurdish-dominated districts, raising questions about what the slate's election strategy is. This slate is considered closest to Ayatollah Sistani, but did not persuade him to make a formal endorsement.
Iraqi National Movement	Formed in October 2009. Led by former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi (Iraq National Accord) who is Shiite but his faction appeals to Sunnis, and Sunni leader Saleh al-Mutlaq (ex-Baathist who leads Iraq Front for National Dialogue). Backed by Iraqi Islamic Party leader and deputy President Tariq Al-Hashimi. However, Justice and Accountability Commission (formerly the De-Bathification Commission) has disqualified Mutlaq and another senior candidate on this slate, Dhafir al Ani, for supporting the outlawed Baath Party. An appeals court affirmed their disqualification. Slate protested the disqualifications and considered, but did not decide to, call for outright election boycott.
Kurdistan Alliance	Competing again in 2010 as a joint KDP-PUK Kurdish list. However, Kurdish solidarity was shaken by July 25, 2009, Kurdistan elections in which a breakaway PUK faction called Change (Gorran) did unexpectedly well. Gorran is running its own separate list for the March 2010 elections, and there has been some violence between PUK and Gorran supporters. PUK's ebbing strength in the north could compromise Talabani's continuation as President after the March 2010 elections, if Talabani, as expected, seeks to remain in office.
Unity Alliance of Iraq	Led by Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, a moderate Shiite who has a reputation for political independence. Bolani has not previously been affiliated with the large Shiite parties such as ISCI and Dawa, and was only briefly affiliated with the Sadrist faction (which has been strong in Bolani's home town of Amarah, in southeastern Iraq). Considered a non-sectarian slate, this list includes Sunni tribal faction led by Shaykh Ahmad Abu Risha, brother of slain leader of the Sunni Awakening movement in Anbar. The list includes first post-Saddam defense minister Sadun al-Dulaymi.

Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Election Law Dispute and Final Provisions

The holding of the elections required passage of an election law setting out the rules and parameters of the election. Under the Iraqi constitution, the elections needed to be held by January 31, 2010, in order to allow 45 days before the March 15, 2010, expiry of the current COR's term. An election held beyond that term expiration date would almost certainly provoke a constitutional crisis. Iraq's election officials had ideally wanted a 90-day time frame between the election law passage and the election date, in order to facilitate the voter registration process.

Because the provisions of the election law (covering such issues as voter eligibility, whether to allot quota seats to certain constituencies, the size of the next COR) have the potential to shape the election outcome, the major Iraqi communities were divided over the substance of the law. These differences caused the COR to miss almost every self-imposed deadline to pass the election law. One dispute was over the election system, with many COR members leaning toward a closed list system (which gives the slates the power to determine who occupies actual COR seats after the election), despite a call by Grand Ayatollah Sistani for an open list vote (which allows voters to also vote for candidates as well as coalition slates). The final law, passed on December 6, 2009, provides for an open list. Each province serves as a single constituency and a fixed number of seats for each province.

There was also a dispute over how to apply the election in disputed Kirkuk province, where Kurds fear that the election law drafts would cause Kurds to be underrepresented in the election. The version of the election law passed by the COR on November 8, 2009 (141 out of 195 COR

deputies voting), called for using 2009 food ration lists as representative of voter registration. The Kurds had sought this provision, facing down the insistence of many COR deputies to use 2005 voter lists, which presumably would contain fewer Kurds. A compromise in that version of the law allowed for a process to review, for one year, complaints about fraudulent registration, thus easing Sunni and Shiite Arab fears about an excessive Kurdish vote in Kirkuk.

However, this version left many Sunni Arabs angry because it guaranteed a small quota of seats for Iraqis living abroad or who are displaced. The mechanism for that guarantee was to create a separate electoral constituency for Iraqis voting from outside Iraq—essentially, a “19th province” constituency. Sunni Iraqis felt that because it is mainly members of their sect who remain displaced, that election law version would underrepresent them. On this basis, one of Iraq’s deputy presidents, Tariq al Hashimi, a Sunni Arab, vetoed the law. The veto, on November 18, sent the law back to the COR.

A new version was adopted on November 23, but it was viewed as even less favorable to Sunni Arabs than the first version, because it eliminated any reserved seats for Iraqis in exile. Hashimi again threatened a veto, which he was required to exercise within 10 days. As that deadline was about to lapse, the major factions, reportedly at the urging of U.S. and other diplomats in Baghdad, reached agreement and adopted a new law on December 6, 2009. It was not vetoed by any member of the presidency council. (According to Article 138 of the Iraqi constitution, after the next election, Iraq is to have a President and at least one Vice President—the “presidency council” concept was an interim measure that is to expire at the end of the current government’s term.)

The election law that was adopted provides for the following:

- Expansion of the size of the COR to 325 total seats. Of these, 310 are allocated by province, with the constituency sizes ranging from Baghdad’s 68 seats to Muthanna’s 7 seats. The COR size, in the absence of a census, was based on taking 2005 population figures and assuming a 2.8% per year growth rate in each province.⁷
- The remaining 15 seats are “compensatory seats”—seats allocated from “leftover” votes; votes for parties and slates that did not meet a minimum threshold to achieve any seats outright. Eight of the compensatory seats are reserved for minorities, and the remaining seven are distributing among the top vote-getting lists in accordance with their vote totals nationwide.
- There is no separate electoral constituency for Iraqis in exile, so Iraqis in exile will have their votes counted in the provinces where these voters originated.
- The election date was set for March 7, 2010.

Flashpoint: Possible Sunni Disillusionment With the Elections

The electoral process since the end of 2005 has, to a large extent, furthered U.S. goals to bring Sunni Muslims ever further into the political structure. Sunnis boycotted the January 2005 parliamentary and provincial elections and were, as a result, poorly represented in all governing

⁷ Analysis of Iraq expert Reidar Visser. “The Hashemi Veto.” <http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2009/11/18/the-hashemi-veto/>

bodies. However, Sunni slates, consisting mainly of urban, educated Sunnis, participated in the December 2005 parliamentary elections.

The 2009 provincial elections furthered the Sunni entry into the political process by attracting the participation of Sunni tribal leaders (“Awakening Councils”) who recruited the Sons of Iraq fighters. These Sunnis had largely stayed out of the December 2005 elections because their attention was focused primarily on the severe violence and instability in the Sunni provinces, particularly Anbar. These tribal figures were intimidated by Al Qaeda in Iraq, which urged Sunnis to stay completely out of what AQ-I asserted was a U.S. occupation-dominated political process.

In the 2009 provincial elections, as the violence ebbed, these Sunni tribalists offered election slates and showed strength at the expense of the established Sunni parties, particularly the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). The main “Iraq Awakening” tribal slate came in first in Anbar Province, according to the final results. At the same time, the established, mostly urban Sunni parties, led by the IIP, had been struggling in 2008 as the broader Accord Front (Tawafuq) fragmented. In the provincial elections, one of its component parties—the National Dialogue Council—ran on slates that competed with the IIP in several provinces.

As noted, in the March 7 election, there is one slate—the Iraq National Movement—that is expected to have strong appeal among Sunnis. In addition, other Sunni figures have joined the predominantly Shiite slates as part of an effort by the leaders of those blocs to appear non-sectarian.

Disqualification Crisis

The Sunni commitment to the political process may now be in jeopardy in the context of a major dispute over candidate eligibility for the March 7, 2010, elections. Although there does not appear to be a broad Sunni boycott of the elections materializing, there is a widespread Sunni Arab perception that the election is unfair because of this dispute. Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups are attempting to play on this dispute to justify attacks intended to dissuade Sunnis from voting and spoil the election. Recognizing the potential for renewed sectarian violence, in late February 2010 the government reinstated to duty about 20,000 (most of them Sunni Arab) military officers who had served in the military during Saddam’s rule but who were purged from the roles after his overthrow.

The acute phase of this political crisis began in January 2010 when the Justice and Accountability Commission (the successor to the “De-Baathification Commission” that worked since the fall of Saddam to purge former Baathists from government) invalidated the candidacies of 499 individuals (out of 6,500 candidates running), spanning many different slates, including some candidates of Maliki’s State of Law list. The Justice and Accountability Commission is headed by Ali al-Lami, a Shiite who had been in U.S. military custody during 2005-2006 for alleged assistance to Iranian agents active in Iraq. He is perceived as answerable to or heavily influenced by Ahmad Chalabi, who had headed the De-Baathification Commission. Both are part of the Iraqi National Alliance slate and both are Shiites, leading many to believe that the disqualifications represented an attempt to exclude prominent Sunnis from the vote.

The Justice and Accountability Commission argued that the disqualifications were based on law and careful evaluation of candidate backgrounds and not based on sect, because many of the candidates disqualified were Shiites. The IHEC reviewed and backed the invalidations on January 14, 2010. Disqualified candidates had three days to file an appeal in court. Apparently due in part

to entreaties from the U.S. Embassy, Vice President Joseph Biden (during a visit to Iraq on January 22, 2010) and partner embassies in Iraq—all of which fear a return to instability that could result from the disqualifications—the appeals court at first ruled that disqualified candidates could run in the election and clear up questions of Baathist affiliation after the election.

However, reported pressure by Maliki and other Shiites caused the court to reverse itself on February 12, 2010, and announce that 145 candidates would be ineligible to run. Twenty-six candidates who had been barred were reinstated. The remaining approximately 300 disqualified candidates had already accepted their disqualification and been replaced by other candidates on their respective slates. The slate most affected by the disqualifications is the Iraq National Movement slate, because two of its leading candidates, National Dialogue Front party leader Saleh al-Mutlaq and Dhafir al-Ani, both Sunnis, were barred from running. This caused the slate to suspend its campaign for three days subsequent to the beginning of campaigning on February 12 (which was a one-week postponement from the original date set for the start of the campaign). However, the slate did not, as a whole, call for a broad boycott and Mutlaq himself dropped his own calls for boycotting the election; the slate is campaigning.

The disqualifications crisis has caused a measure of alarm within the Obama Administration, which perceives in it the potential for re-ignition of sectarian violence, a long delay in forming the next government, and the jeopardizing of U.S. military draw-down plans. U.S. plans call for a withdrawal of about 50,000 forces from the time of the election until August 2010, to a level of about 50,000 force remaining after August 2010. It is conceivable that, if the formation of a government is delayed substantially, the drawdown of 50,000 combat troops may have to be extended beyond August 2010.

The crisis might account for February 16, 2010, comments by Gen. Ray Odierno, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, that Iran is working through Chalabi and al-Lami to undermine the legitimacy of the elections. Gen. Odierno specifically asserted that Chalabi is in close contact with a close Iraqi ally of Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleimani, who commands the Qods Force unit of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).⁸ The Iraqi, whose name is Jamal al-Ibrahimi, is a member of the COR. Chalabi's successful efforts to turn the election into a campaign centered on excluding ex-Baathists—which Sunnis view as a codeword for their sect—has caused particular alarm among experts.

This crisis adds to already growing Sunni resentment because of the slow pace with which the Maliki government has implemented its pledge to fully integrate the "Sons of Iraq" fighters into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). About 100,000 (80% are Sunni Arab) of these fighters nationwide cooperated with U.S. forces against Al Qaeda in Iraq and other militants. Only about 30,000 have been integrated into the ISF or given the civilian government jobs they were promised, to date.

Other Ongoing Frictions: KRG-Central Government Disputes

The elections processes have not healed the disputes between the KRG and the central government. However, KRG President Masoud Barzani visited Washington, DC, in January 2010 and, according to participants in his meetings, discussed with senior officials ways in which the Kurds will cooperate with Iraq's Arabs after the election to form a new government. Still, the

⁸ Gertz, Bill. "Inside the Ring." *Washington Times*, February 18, 2010.

elections, and any likely new government, will not likely produce a resolution of KRG-Baghdad disputes over KRG insistence that it control its own oil resources, disputes over security control over areas inhabited by Kurds, and the Kurds' claim that the province of Tamim (Kirkuk) be formally integrated into the KRG.

These differences were aggravated by the 2009 provincial elections because Sunni Arabs wrested control of the Nineveh (Mosul) provincial council from the Kurds, who won control of that council in the 2005 election because of the broad Sunni Arab boycott of that election. A Sunni list (al-Hadba'a) won a clear plurality of the Nineveh vote and subsequently took control of the provincial administration there. Al-Hadba'a is composed of hardline Sunni Arabs who openly oppose Kurdish encroachment in the province and who are committed to the "Arab and Islamic identity" of the province. A member of the faction, Ajil al-Nufaiji, is the governor, and the Kurds have prevented his visitation of areas of Nineveh where the Kurds' *peshmerga* militia operates.

In part to prevent outright violence, Gen. Odierno, in August 2009, proposed to send U.S. forces to partner with *peshmerga* units (a development without precedent) and with ISF units in the province to build confidence between the two forces and reassure Kurdish, Arab, Turkomen, and other residents of the province. That plan began implementation in January 2010. Nineveh has seen several high-profile attacks since the U.S. pullout from Iraqi cities on June 30, 2009.

Additional friction surrounded the KRG's parliamentary and presidential elections on July 25, 2009. The KRG leadership had been planning, during that vote, to conduct a referendum on a separate KRG constitution. However, the central government asserted that a KRG constitution would conflict with the publicly adopted national constitution, and that the KRG draft constitution, adopted by the Kurdish parliament on June 23, 2009, claimed Kurdish control over disputed territories and oil resources. The KRG backed down and did not hold the referendum.

The KRG elections also, to some extent, shuffled the political landscape. A breakaway faction of President Talabani's PUK, called "Change" ("Gorran"), won an unexpectedly high 25 seats (out of 111) in the Kurdistan national assembly, embarrassing the PUK and weakening it relative to the KDP. KRG President Masoud Barzani, leader of the KDP, easily won reelection against weak opposition. Maliki met with Barzani in the Kurdish region on August 2, 2009, the first direct meeting between the two in a year, signaling Maliki's inclination to appear magnanimous and open to compromise. Gorran is running its own list in the March 2010 elections.

Another mixed province, Diyala, was hotly contested among Shiite and Sunni Arab and Kurdish slates, reflecting the character of the province as another front line between the Kurds and the central government. The provincial version of the Accord Front narrowly beat out the Kurds for first place in the province, but has subsequently allied with the Kurds and with ISCI to set up the provincial administration. There continues to be substantial friction between Sunni and Shiite Arabs in that province, in part because Sunni militants drove out many Shiites from the province at the height of the civil conflict during 2005-2007.

Sadr Remains Weakened

U.S. officials are hoping that the March 2010 elections continue a trend toward weakening Moqtada al-Sadr's faction. The faction was already weakened by the March 2008 government offensive against Sadr's militia in Basra, as well as by its poor showings in the January 2009 provincial elections. In the provincial elections, the Sadr faction, represented mainly in the "Independent Liberals Trend" list, did not come close to winning outright control of any councils,

although it won enough seats in several southern provinces to, through deal making, gain senior positions in a few southern provinces. The relatively poor showing of the Sadrist was viewed as reflecting voter disillusionment with parties that continue to field militias—which many Iraqis blame for much of the violence that has plagued Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein.

As noted above, Sadr has joined an anti-Maliki Shiite coalition (Iraqi National Alliance) for the March 2010 national elections. On October 17, 2009, the Sadr movement held a “primary” election to determine who would fill the 329 total candidate slots that will be fielded by the Sadr movement in the elections (as part of the broader Iraqi National Alliance bloc discussed above).

Although Sadr is participating full force in the March elections, some worry that militias loyal to him or splinter militias could become more active after the elections, depending on the outcome. The U.S. ability to constrain them will decline as U.S. forces draw down between the elections and August 2010. Some U.S. commanders say in early 2010 that they are starting to see some signs of increased Shiite militia activity around Iraq, including the south, as the elections approach. A number of splinter groups of Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia, including the “Special Groups,” the Promised Day Brigade, and Kata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Battalions) operate in southern Iraq. On July 2, 2009, the State Department named Kata’ib Hezbollah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). About 800 total candidates competed for the slots.

Other Elections Possible

There has been consistent speculation that the March National Assembly elections would be held concurrently with a referendum on the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. The referendum was to be held by July 31, 2009, but the United States, which views the referendum as unnecessary, supported a delay. In mid-October 2009, Iraqi parliamentarians quietly shelved the referendum vote by failing to act on legislation to hold the referendum and focusing instead on the broader election law needed for the National Assembly elections.⁹

District and sub-district elections were previously slated for July 31, 2009, as well. However, those are delayed, and the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon said in a report on U.N. operations in Iraq, released August 3, 2009, that these elections would likely be held later in 2010, after the National Assembly elections.

Several other possible elections in Iraq are as yet unscheduled. If there is a settlement between the KRG and Baghdad over Kirkuk and other territories, there could be a referendum to ratify any settlement that is reached. Under Article 140 of the Constitution, a referendum was to be held by December 31, 2007, but the Kurds have agreed to repeated delays in order to avoid jeopardizing overall progress in Iraq. Because the three Kurdish-controlled provinces and the disputed province of Kirkuk did not hold provincial elections with the rest of Iraq on January 31, 2009, elections are required in those provinces at some point, presumably subsequent to a settlement of the Kirkuk dispute. (For more information on Kurd-Baghdad disputes, see CRS Report RS22079, *The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq*, by Kenneth Katzman.)

There could also be a vote on amendments to Iraq’s 2005 constitution if and when the major factions agree to finalize the recommendations of the constitutional review commission (CRC).

⁹ Sly, Liz. “Iraqi Push Fades For Referendum on U.S. Troop Pullout.” *Los Angeles Times*, October 16, 2009.

There have been no recent major developments reported that would indicate if and when such a referendum might be ready.

Table 2. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates)

Baghdad—55 regular seats, plus one Sabeen and one Christian set-aside seat	State of Law (Maliki)—38% (28 seats); Independent Liberals Trend (pro-Sadr)—9% (5 seats); Accord Front (Sunni mainstream)—9% (9 seats); Iraq National (Allawi)—8.6%; Shahid Mihrab and Independent Forces (ISCI)—5.4% (3 seats); National Reform list (of former P.M. Ibrahim al-Jafari)—4.3% (3 seats)
Basra—34 regular seats, plus one Christian seat	State of Law—37% (20); ISCI—11.6% (5); Sadr—5% (2); Fadhila (previously dominant in Basra)—3.2% (0); Allawi—3.2% (0); Jafari list—2.5% (0). New Governor: Shilagh Abbud (Maliki list); Council chair: Jabbar Amin (Maliki list)
Nineveh—34 regular seats, plus one set aside for Shabaks, Yazidis, and Christians	Hadbaa—48.4%; Fraternal Nineveh—25.5%; IIP—6.7%; Hadbaa has taken control of provincial council and administration, excluding the Kurds. Governor is Atheel al-Nujaifi of Hadbaa.
Najaf—28 seats	State of Law—16.2% (7); ISCI—14.8% (7); Sadr—12.2% (6); Jafari—7% (2); Allawi—1.8% (0); Fadhila—1.6% (0). Council chairman: Maliki list
Babil—30 seats	State of Law—12.5% (8); ISCI—8.2% (5); Sadr—6.2% (3); Jafari—4.4% (3); Allawi—3.4%; Accord Front—2.3% (3); Fadhila—1.3%. New Council chair: Kadim Majid Tuman (Sadrlist)
Diyala—29 seats	Accord Front list—21.1%; Kurdistan Alliance—17.2%; Allawi—9.5%; State of Law—6%. New council leans heavily Accord, but allied with Kurds and ISCI.
Muthanna—26 seats	State of Law—10.9% (5); ISCI—9.3% (5); Jafari—6.3% (3); Sadr—5.5% (2); Fadhila—3.7%.
Anbar—29 seats	Iraq Awakening (Sahawa-Sunni tribals)—18%; National Iraqi Project Gathering (established Sunni parties, excluding IIP)—17.6%; Allawi—6.6%; Tribes of Iraq—4.5%.
Maysan—27 seats	State of Law—17.7% (8); ISCI—14.6% (8); Sadr—7; Jafari—8.7% (4); Fadhila—3.2%; Allawi—2.3%. New Governor: Mohammad al-Sudani (Maliki); Council chair: Hezbollah Iraq
Dhi Qar—31 seats	State of Law—23.1% (13); pro-Sadr—14.1% (7); ISCI—11.1% (5); Jafari—7.6% (4); Fadhila—6.1%; Allawi—2.8%. New governor—Maliki list; Council chair: Sadrlist
Karbala—27 seats	List of Maj. Gen. Yusuf al-Habbubi (Saddam-era local official)—13.3% (1 seat); State of Law—8.5% (9); Sadr—6.8% (4); ISCI—6.4% (4); Jafari—2.5%; Fadhila—2.5%.
Salah Ad Din—28 seats	IIP-led list—14.5%; Allawi—13.9%; Sunni list without IIP—8.7%; State of Law—3.5%; ISCI—2.9%. New council leans Accord/IIP
Qadissiyah—28 seats	State of Law—23.1% (11); ISCI—11.7% (5); Jafari—8.2% (3); Allawi—8%; Sadr—6.7% (2); Fadhila—4.1%. New governor: Salim Husayn (Maliki list)
Wasit—28 seats	State of Law—15.3% (13); ISCI—10% (6); Sadr—6% (3); Allawi—4.6%; Fadhila—2.7%. New governor: Shiite independent; Council chair: ISCI

Source: UNAMI translation of results issued February 2, 2009, by the Independent Higher Election Commission of Iraq; Vissar, Reidar. The Provincial Elections: The Seat Allocation Is Official and the Coalition-Forming Process Begins. February 19, 2009.

Table 3. Election Results (January and December 2005)

Bloc/Party	Seats (Jan. 05)	Seats (Dec. 05)
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). Now 85 seats after departure of Fadilah (15 seats) and Sadr faction (28 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has 30; Da'wa Party (25 total: Maliki faction, 12, and Anizi faction, 13); independents (30).	140	128
Kurdistan Alliance—KDP (24); PUK (22); independents (7)	75	53
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote.	40	25
Iraq Accord Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP, Tariq al-Hashimi, 26 seats); National Dialogue Council of Khalaf Ulayyan (7); General People's Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi (7); independents (4).	—	44
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan. 2005 vote.	—	11
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)	2	5
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote	—	0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote	5	—
Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)	3	1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr	3	2
People's Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote	2	—
Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)	2	0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)	1	—
Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)	1	1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Umar al-Jabburi, Sunni, secular)	1	3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)	0	1
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)	—	1

Notes: Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election; 15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million).

Table 4. Assessments of the Benchmarks

Benchmark	July 12, 2007 Admin. Report	GAO (Sept. 07)	Sept. 14, 2007 Admin. Report	Subsequent Actions and Assessments—May 2008 Administration report, June 2008 GAO report, International Compact with Iraq Review in June 2008, and U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Reports (and various press sources)
1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) and completing review	(S) satisfactory	unmet	S	CRC filed final report in August 2008 but major issues remain unresolved and require achievement of consensus among major faction leaders.
2. Enacting and implementing laws on De-Baathification	(U) unsatisfact.	unmet	S	“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12, 2008. Allows about 30,000 fourth ranking Baathists to regain their jobs, and 3,500 Baathists in top three party ranks would receive pensions. Could allow for judicial prosecution of all ex-Baathists and bars ex-Saddam security personnel from regaining jobs. As noted, De-Baathification officials have used the new law to try to harm the prospects of their rivals in March 2010 elections.
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that ensure equitable distribution of resources	U	unmet	U	Framework and three implementing laws stalled over KRG-central government disputes; only framework law has reached COR to date. Revenue being distributed equitably, and 2009 budget maintains 17% revenue for KRG. Kurds also getting that share of oil exported from newly producing fields in KRG area. Some U.S. assessments say factions unlikely to reach agreement on these laws in the near term.
4. Enacting and implementing laws to form semi-autonomous regions	S	partly met	S	Regions law passed October 2006, with relatively low threshold (petition by 33% of provincial council members) to start process to form new regions, but main blocs agreed that law would take effect April 2008. November 2008: petition by 2% of Basra residents submitted to IHEC (another way to start forming a region) to convert Basra province into a single province “region. Signatures of 8% more were required by mid-January 2009; not achieved.
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to establish a higher electoral commission, (b) provincial elections law; (c) a law to specify authorities of provincial bodies, and (d) set a date for provincial elections	S on (a) and U on the others	overall unmet; (a) met	S on (a) and (c)	Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments adopted February 13, 2008, took effect April 2008. Implementing election law adopted September 24, 2008, provided for provincial elections by January 31, 2009. Those elections were held, as discussed above.
6. Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty for former insurgents	no rating	unmet	Same as July	Law to amnesty “non-terrorists” among 25,000 Iraq-held detainees passed February 13, 2008. Of 23,000 granted amnesty, about 6,300 released to date. 19,000 detainees held by U.S. being transferred to Iraqi control under SOFA.
7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia disarmament	no rating	unmet	Same as July	Basra operation, discussed above, viewed as move against militias. On April 9, 2008, Maliki demanded all militias disband as condition for their parties to participate in provincial elections. Law on militia demobilization stalled.
8. Establishing political, media, economic,	S	met	met	No change. “Executive Steering Committee” works with U.S.-led forces.

Benchmark	July 12, 2007 Admin. Report	GAO (Sept. 07)	Sept. 14, 2007 Admin. Report	Subsequent Actions and Assessments—May 2008 Administration report, June 2008 GAO report, International Compact with Iraq Review in June 2008, and U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Reports (and various press sources)
and services committee to support U.S. “surge”				
9. Providing three trained and ready brigades to support U.S. surge	S	partly met	S	Eight brigades assigned to assist the surge. Surge now ended.
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with authorities to make decisions, without political intervention, to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias	U	unmet	S to pursue extremists U on political interference	No significant change. Still some U.S. concern over the Office of the Commander in Chief (part of Maliki’s office) control over appointments to the ISF—favoring Shiites. Still, some politically motivated leaders remain in ISF. But, National Police said to include more Sunnis in command jobs and rank and file than one year ago. Defense and Interior ministers filed candidacies for the March 2010 elections, involving them in national political contest.
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) providing even-handed enforcement of law	U	unmet	S on military, U on police	U.S. interpreted Basra operation as effort by Maliki to enforce law even-handedly. Tribal support councils not even-handed.
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad will not provide a safe haven for any outlaw, no matter the sect	S	partly met	S	No change. Ethno-sectarian violence has fallen sharply in Baghdad.
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b) eliminating militia control of local security	Mixed. S on (a); U on (b)	unmet	same as July 12	Sectarian violence has not re-accelerated. Shiite militias weak.
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security stations	S	met	S	Over 50 joint security stations operated in Baghdad at the height of U.S. troop surge. Now closed in compliance with June 30, 2009, U.S. pull out from the cities. U.S. troops ring cities, including Baghdad.
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating independently	U	unmet	U	ISF expected to secure Iraq by the end of 2011 under the SOFA, which requires U.S. troops to be out by then. Obama Administration officials say ISF will meet the challenges, although some decrease in U.S. confidence in light of high profile attacks. Iraqi Air Force not likely to be able to secure airspace by then and has requested advanced weaponry, including F-16s.
16. Ensuring protection of minority parties in COR	S	met	S	No change. Rights of minority parties protected by Article 37 of constitution. Minorities given a minimum seat allocated in election law for march vote.
17. Allocating and spending \$10 billion in 2007 capital budget for reconstruction.	S	partly met	S	About 63% of the \$10 billion 2007 allocation for capital projects was spent.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not falsely accusing ISF members	U	unmet	U	Some governmental recriminations against some ISF officers still observed.

Source: Compiled by CRS

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